The effect of oil production on the agricultural economy of Nigeria, 1970-1980 by Igbokwe, Echeazu Jude
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1983
The effect of oil production on the agricultural
economy of Nigeria, 1970-1980
Echeazu Jude Igbokwe
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Igbokwe, Echeazu Jude, "The effect of oil production on the agricultural economy of Nigeria, 1970-1980" (1983). Retrospective Theses
and Dissertations. 16518.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/16518
c . . 
The effect of oi l production on the agricultural 
economy of Nigeria, 1970-1980 
by 
Echeazu Jude Igbokwe 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Major: Economics 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1983 
Copyright(£) Echeazu Jude Igbokwe, 1983. All rights reserved. 
1461163 
,, .... 
; ; 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I . INTRODUCTION 
A. Preamble 
B. Statement of Problem 
C. Objectives of the Study 
II . LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Agricultural Economy 
1. Agricultural production and the state 
of the economy between 1960-1970 
2. Agricultural production and the state 
of the economy between 1970-1980 
B. Oil Economy 
1. Oil production and the state of the 
economy between 1960-1970 
2. Oil production and the state of the 
economy between 1970-1980 
III. POLICY FORMULATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. Government Policies on Agricultural and 
Oil Production 
B. Implementation of Government Policies 
C. Economic Analysis and Impact of Government Policies 
D. Alternatives for Economic Revitalization 
IV. DATA ACQUI SITION 
A. Material s and Methods 
B. Test Procedure 
Page 
1 
1 
5 
6 
8 
8 
8 
19 
25 
25 
29 
38 
38 
47 
51 
55 
59 
59 
60 
iii 
V. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
A. Gross National Product and Oil Production 
B. Total Imports and Oil Production 
C. Government Consumption and Oil Production 
D. Private Consumption and Oil Production 
E. The Consumer Price Index and the Oil Production 
Index 
F. Cocoa Production and Oil Production 
VI . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Page 
62 
62 
66 
73 
76 
80 
84 
87 
90 
94 
iv 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Major agricultural production ('000 metric tons 
and '000 heads) 
Table 2. Gross National Product 
Table 3. Consumer Price Index 
Table 4. Unemployment 
Table 5. Total exports 
Table 6. Total imports 
Table 7. Crude petroleum production 
Table 8. Crude petroleum 
Table 9. Price of crude oil ($s per barrel--monthly average) 
Table 10. Government finance, deficit (-) or surplus (+) 
(millions of Naira) 
Table 11. Steel consumption 
Table 12. Government consumption 
Table 13. Private consumption 
Table 14. Nigerian railway deficits, 1969-74 
Table 15. Anticipated source of high-level manpower 
suppl y , 1975-80 
Table 16. GNP in current and 1975 prices for the years 
1960-80 
Table 17 . Surrmary of statistical results 
Page 
10 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
27 
28 
30 
31 
34 
35 
36 
49 
51 
63 
69 
v 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Cocoa production in Nigeria, 1960-80 
Figure 2. Gross National Products (millions of N) 
Figure 3. Consumer Price Index 
Figure 4. Unemployment 
Figure 5. Total exports 
Figure 6. Total imports 
Figure 7. Crude petroleum production 
Figure 8 . Crude petroleum 
Figure 9. Price of crude oil ($s per barrel--monthly average) 
Figure 10. Government finance, deficit (-) or surplus (+) 
(millions of Naira) 
Figure 11. Steel consumption 
Figure 12. Government consumption 
Figure 13. Private consumption 
Figure 14a. Gross National Product in current and deflated 
Naira 
Figure 14b. Plot of Gross National Product and time 
Figure 15. Plot of total imports and oil production 
Figure 16. Plot of observed and predi cted values of 
total imports 
Figure 17a. Plot of government consumption and oil production 
Figure 17b. Plot of observed and pred icted values of 
government consumption 
Page 
12 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
27 
28 
30 
31 
34 
35 
36 
64 
65 
67 
71 
74 
75 
vi 
Page 
Figure 18a. Plot of private consumption and oil production 77 
Figure 18b. Plot of observed and predicted values for 78 private consumption 
Figure 19a. Plot of consumer price index and oil production 81 index 
Figure 19b. Plot of the observed and predicted values for 82 the consumer price index 
Figure 20 . Plot of cocoa production and oil production 85 
vii 
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CPI = Consumer Price Index 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
GNP = Gross National Product 
IFSY = International Financial Sta ti stica l Yearbook 
NAFP = National Accelerated Food Production 
NEPD = Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 
NNPC = Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
OFN = Operation Feed the Nation 
OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
y 
x 
M 
G 
c 
A 
Q 
Pi's 
s 
r 
r2 
t 
= GNP 
= time 
= tota 1 inputs 
= government consumption 
= private consumption 
= consumer price index 
= cocoa production 
= oil producti on 
= variance 
= correlation coefficient 
= coefficient of detennination 
=students 't ' test statistic 
= intercept 
= slope 
= error term 
= sum of squares for error 
= estimate of a value 
= null hypothesis 
= alternate hypothesis 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the title of the thesis suggests, oil production in many countries 
that are dependent on it has had a trememdnous impact in the shaping of 
the country ' s future. Whereas in some countries, the impact has been posi-
tive, in others, the news has not been so good. One such country is 
Nigeria, the subject of my inquiry. For a comprehensive analysis, I will 
break down Nigeria's Economic trend into three phases: Phase 1--(Prior 
to 1960) The Subsistence Economy. Phase 11--(1960-1970) The Agricultural / 
Plantation Economy. Phase 111--(1970-present) The Oil Economy. 
A. Preamble 
There has been a series of research studies done by economists on the 
question of export expans ion, diversification and stability in order to 
evaluate the situation whereby countries depend solely on exports for their 
economic development. The conclusion of such research have not gone un-
noticed. James Love (28) concluded that export diversi fication led to a 
bigger increase in instability in earnings. Ann Seidman (40) on the other 
hand concluded that export expansion by itself is unlikely to contribute to 
higher standards of living for the broad masses of the population and has 
called ~n African countries in particular to restructure their economies 
and reduce dependence on exports in order to attain development. The 
reason given for such a conclusion i s that growth of demand for Africa's 
main exports which employs millions of peasants and wage earners is 
likely to be limited in most cases to less than 3% a year, barely enough 
to pennit export expansion to keep up with population growth rates. 
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Since oil production and exportation has been Nigeria's economic main-
stay since 1970, there have been calls recently for wisdom in the utiliza-
tion and dependence of such a resource. One of the reasons for this call, 
according to Fu (8), has been given as the world's present production 
practices and the stagnating economies of the major industrial countries, 
which has lead to the prediction that oil supplies will certainly con-
tinue to outstrip requirements and that oil prices will continue to drop. 
An example has been given with a decline in OPEC 1 s (Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) output from 30.77 million barrels per day 
(bpd) in 1979 to 26.88 million bpd in 1980, almost a 13% decl ine within 
one year. 
In trying to maximize the income from oil production and exportation, 
Nigeria has allowed the most important part of its economic activity--
agriculture--to suffer. Wen (53) tried to put the two problems together 
by saying that despite the current oil surplus, several West African 
countries are rapidly developing their oil production capacities. Approxi-
mately 1,000 oil and gas wells were developed in 1981 and the number of 
wells may reach 2,000 in 1982. Estimates indicate that the region's off-
shore oil deposits contain at least 3 billion barrels. Nigeria and Gabon 
have been s ingled out as the largest oil producers in West Africa who are 
also members of OPEC. Wen (53) al so contends that though their petro 
income has steadily increased since 1967, the recent boom in oil explora-
tion and production is having a negative impact on economic development. 
Agriculture has been particularly hurt. As a result, they are attempting 
to make adjustments which will provide a better balance between their 
3 
rapidly developing petroleum industries and other sectors of their national 
economies. 
The general condition of things in Nigeria was poetically summarized 
by the Economist (16). "Nigeria is the giant of Africa, one of the world's 
ten most populous nations (approximately 80 million people), strategically 
vital, rich in natural resources (especially oil) and wooed by east and 
west, rich and poor alike .... Russians get stuck in the left with 
Taiwanese. Brazilians compete with firms to hire the only taxis with a 
working air conditioner. Americans paddle through fresh sewage to the 
headquarters of their own banks. Everywhere the British--Nigeria's 
former colonial masters, stil l its biggest overseas suppliers--struggle to 
modify their grammer to match that of West African pidgin. These for-
eigners from every quarter of the globe wear a baffled look, sweating as 
much from psychological stress as from the steaming outdoor heat. How can 
so much money and such high hopes engender such chaos? Why won't the tele-
phones, or the bureaucrats, work? Why can't you turn on a switch, or a 
tap, or turn up for a scheduled flight, with any confidence that light, or 
a journey will result? Why, at almost every level of public and private 
administration, do people expect bribes? Why is almost everyone so in-
fernally aggressive, and why when aggressive driving kills people, can't 
they at least clear the corpses off the streets?" In the Economist (17), 
the attitude of the people in Nigeria was brought out by an American 
visitor who said: ''These guys are nature's capitalists." But if 
capitalism is about investment and production, "Capitalists they are not 
because everyone wants to buy and sell and nobody wants to make or grow 
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things." reiterated the Economist. 
It has been widely echoed by researchers and the Economist (21) that 
oil speeded Nigerians rush from village to town as people opted for big 
salaries in booming coastal ports or government centers. Population in-
creased rapidly, growing at about 3-3~% a year. Government held food 
prices down to quiet city dwellers . This situation gave farmers no in-
centive to produce or market their crops. Between 1972 and 1980, food 
production per head fell by approximately 35-50%. Food imports rose 250% 
and farming for exports--the traditional mainstay of the economy--
virtually died. The showdown induced by the oil glut gives Nigeria a 
chance to ponder the madcap expenditures and gross overvaluation of the 
oil boom years. 
It is important for the government and people of Nigeria to remember 
that there are great potential s in the country. In the words of Ekundare 
(6), "Nigeria has the largest concentration of natural and human resources 
on the continent of Africa. With a probable population of approximately 
64 mill ion in 1970 and an estimated 80 million by the end of the second 
United Nations Development decade in 1980, Nigeria is the most attractive 
single market in Africa. 11 Nweke (33) on the other hand said: "Whereas 
the petroleum sector was greatly expanded and intensively exploited under 
military rule, the agricultural sector was allowed to dwindle. In the 
end, Nigeria's economy in the 1970s became dependent on oil . 11 I cannot 
conclude this preamble without picturing the current situation in Nigeria 
in the words of Hill (14) who said: "The African landscape is littered 
with the remnants of failed agricultural schemes. Agricultural 
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schemes are commonly overcapitalized, underpl anned and poorly managed .. 
Even at their high cost, the settlements neither increased agricultural 
production nor reduced urban unemployment." 
B. Statement of Problem 
Nigeria was known as an agricultural country until the early 1970s, 
when it was noticed that oil production was available in commercial 
quantity. Being a developing nation, the problems that plague such 
countries when such wealth is discovered is one of the subjects of my 
inquiry. Nigeria was known for her exports of agricultural products , 
such as cocoa, palm-oil, palm-kernel, groundnuts, cotton, rubber, coffee, 
etc . These were predominantly cash crops and their production was or-
ganized in a plantation-type setting. This is one of the reasons why in 
Nigeria today there exists abandoned and large agricultural plantations. 
Nigeria was successful in the exportation of these agricultural 
products and thus, earned a fairly handsome revenue from them. Since the 
subject of my inquiry and analysis occurred in phase II and III of the 
country's economic trend. I will not be dealing with phase I . Problems 
that characterized phase II include: inadequate manpower, technology, 
research and development and capital. These drawbacks affected the po-
tential earning capability of the country. Although these problems 
existed, agriculture was still able to continue operating on a labor 
intensive basis . This was the situation before the 1970s. 
With the discovery of crude oil in conmercial quantity in 1970, 
Nigeria quickly moved to establish oil production as a major export com-
modity. This marked the beginning of the phase III period in the economy. 
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Although profitability was more evident in the oil exportation with mini-
mum labor inputs, Nigeria was not adequately prepared to make such a 
switch in so short a time. The switch was nevertheless made, from an agri -
cultural exporting and "fairly self-supporting" country to an oil exporting 
and "heavily dependent" country, with regard to feeding the masses of its 
population. 
A lot of policy questions arise from this Switch and among them are 
the following: Why was such a move made in a hurry? Despite the fact 
that oil was found in a coJTJTiercially available quantity, why was agriculture 
neglected and abandoned? What happened to the agricultural plantations 
that formally existed in the country? What of the manpower needs, the 
technological needs, and the capital needs of the economy. Were they 
satisfied or met before the switch was made? Was there any consideration 
that oil was a nonrenewable and exhaustible resource? What will happen to 
the economy when the oil is depleted? How were Nigerians affected by the 
switch? How has Nigeria fared with the oil economy? These and other 
questions that arise from the switch will be analyzed, especially how the 
switch affected the export and import structure and the overall economic 
trends in Nigeria. Finally, the economic stability in Nigeria will be 
looked at using the two periods as a reference point. 
C. The Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of the study is to examine the period of study 
which include 1960 to 1980 to see the trend of economic activities and 
policy formulations and implications as they affected the overall economy 
of Nigeria. This period was chosen because of the sign ificant events that 
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occurred within the period. Agriculture boomed in the 1960s and was 
virtually abandoned by the people and government of Nigeria for oil pro-
duction in 1970. By the middle of 1970, there were realizations of pos-
sible mistakes by the government in the policies that affected the de-
cision to move to phase III period of the economy. Efforts to revive 
agricultural production in the name of 11 0peration Feed the Nation" (OFN) 
and later "the Green Revolution 11 proved futile. 
Towards the end of the 1970 decade up to 1980, oil revenue started to 
decline as the world oil glut started and the world oil market began to be 
very turbulent, moving in a cyclical pattern, but with a constant and 
steady decline. There were also a lot of entries into the oil production 
market by many countries that discovered this natural resource. This 
situation helped the price of oil to decline and has led to the oil cartels 
fighting to restore initial equilibrium in the market. How far this will 
be a success is yet to be seen. It is because of these problems that 
Nigeria, within the phase III period, has moved from a fairly self-feeding 
nation to a massive importer of food for its people. The net effect on the 
total revenue has, therefore, been negative. This research, therefore, has 
as its ultimate goal the evaluation of policy formulations and implications 
as they have brought the country to the current economic crisis and how 
such problems can be avoided in the future. 
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I I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Agricultural Economy 
The contributions of agriculture to the overall economy are high-
lighted here. As I indicated earlier for simplicity, phase II and III 
will be analyzed separately and since phase I is not applicable to my 
research, it is not considered. 
1. Agricultural production and the state of 
the economy between 1960-1970 
Since agricultural production was the mainstay of the economy in 
Nigeria within this period, one would expect that it performed well . The 
fact is that within this period, Nigeria knew her capability and thus man-
aged the economy as such. The major agricultural export products include: 
cocoa, cotton, palm-oil, palm-kernel and groundnuts. These products con-
stituted the major exports for Nigeria. Although sensitivity to prices, 
as well as competition influenced these economic activities, they were 
not enough to drastically change the course of the economy if there were an 
international financial crunch. 
Approximately 80% of West Africa's population is engaged in agri-
culture and the figure is about the same for Nigeria alone. The agri-
cultural products that were the major exports were important to the 
country's position in the world market. According to Wen (53), in the 
1960s, Nigeria was a leading exporter of cocoa, palm-oil, groundnut and 
cotton . The Economist (17) also echoed this trend by indicating that 
"farming for exports was the mainstay of colonial Nigeria, whose modest 
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vi abil; ty was based on palm-oil, rubber, cocoa and groundnuts . " These 
crops were plantation crops owned by expatriate firms and worked by 
sweated labor. At the same time, some of the export crops were grown by 
local peasants and marketed by local middlemen before they reached the 
trading companies on their way overseas. It should also be noted that 
some of the export crops like oil palms grew wild. Nigerian export agri-
culture, thus put money straight into the countryside, and was the main-
stay of thriving indigenous communities. Thus, in the words of Ekundare 
(6) in the 1962-63 fiscal year, agriculture accounted for approximately 65% 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 63% in 1966/67 fiscal year. These 
agricultural products also include forestry and fishing. Adani (1) 
emphasized that out of N2493.4 million of GDP in 1960, mining and quarry-
ing contributed a mere 1.2%, manufacturing and craft contributed less 
than 5%, utilities 0.5% and the rest was from agriculture . 
Agriculture has always been the most important single activity in 
the Nigerian economy. According to Nweke (33), 80% of the total popula-
tion is engaged in it, producing yams, cassava, plantain, rice, beans, 
sugar cane and citrus fruits for food and local consumption and cocoa, 
oil-palm produce, groundnuts, rubber, cotton and timber as raw materials 
for local industries and for exports . 
A l ook at Table 1 will show a fairly stable agricultural production 
between 1960 and 1969 (48) . A pictorial analys is of one of the data is shown 
in Figure 1 (48). hiasmuch as there were little fluctuations, they resulted 
from natural causes rather than a predetermined economic policy. Gross 
national product (GNP) rose steadily from 1960- 1966 and declined in 1967 as 
Table 1. Major agr1cultural production ( '000 metric tons and '000 heads) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Cocoa 189. 2 193.9 178.8 219.6 298.3 184 .6 267 .2 238 191.8 220.8 
Coffee 2.0 3.1 3 .2 3.0 
Cotton 30 52 29 49 44 44 52 27 56 92 
Groundnuts 1150 1245 1515 1393 1251 1687 1693 1558 1813 1846 (i n shells) 
Cattle 7445 7470 7515 
Maize 1143 900 1118 1105 1130 914 707 688 816 910 
Palm-Kernel 430 437 .l 368 420.3 407.9 456.4 421 241 214 255 
Palm-Oil 552 541 509 510 515 530 551 320 336 418 
Rice 360 340 350 330 400 350 200 301 275 282 
\/heat 
Source: 1979/80 Statistics yearbook, p. 724 
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1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
304.8 256.6 241. l 215.0 214 215.0 165 202 160 180 175 
2.8 4.2 4.2 2.3 2.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.6 4. 5 3.0 
39 35 48 48 30 52 61 81 37 37 30 
1581 1554 945 350 400 280 500 300 450 540 570 
11183 11293 11103 10920 10918 11000 -- -- 11800 12000 12300 
1046 755 857 547 1215 1260 1300 1350 1480 1500 1550 
315 307 270 231 310 300 295 302 239 335 345 
488 500 460 590 600 640 655 660 670 650 675 
343 388 310 487 525 515 387 408 515 600 725 
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a result of the Nigerian civil war . It picked up again towards the end of 
the civil war in 1969. The GNP data are shown in Table 2 (15) and graphed 
in Figure 2. Consumer Price Index (CPI) which is used as a factor to de-
flate GNP and other measures of economic wealth to "cancel out" the effect 
of inflation or deflation, s hows that the index figures between 1960 and 
1969 never exceeded 46.4% with 1975 as a base year. This is shown in 
Table 3 and Figure 3 (15). It should be realized however, that since CPI 
only measures a certain quantity and selection of a basket of goods, it 
might be a little misleading for the deflati on of GNP, but since there is 
no available data for the GNP implicit price deflator, one would have 
no other choice than to use what is available. A look at the unemployment 
data and graph in Table 4 and Figure 4 (48) respectively will tend to be a 
little bit misleading. There were lots of causes for the high unemployment 
rate, wh ich includes: illiteracy rate, overpopulation, inadequate capital 
and investment opportunities, lack of technological improvements for the 
farm sector, fragmented lands, and above all, corrupt public officials . 
The striking point in Figure 4 is the unemployment rate of 26.6% in 1966 
whi ch was one of the straws that led to the 1966 disturbance in Nigeria 
and eventually to the Civil War. 
Exports in Nigeria ranged between N350 million in 1960 to N683 million 
in 1969. (Note: $1.00 = N0.68) [See Table 5 and Figure 5 (15)]. Imports 
ranged from N487 in 1960 to N702 in 1969 (See Table 6 and Figure 6.). All 
these situations led to a negligible deficit which still left Nigeria 
economically viable. It is also because of the nature of the agricultural 
economy between 1960 and 1969 that both private and government consumption 
14 
Table 2. Gross National Product (millions of H) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 ~ 
2,401 2,373 2,526 2,912 3,127 3,302 3,532 2,869 2 ,802 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
5, 125 6,853 7,133 8 ,400 16,581 20,059 24 ,522 27. 772 28 ,716 
Source: IFSY 1982, IMF Publications, p. 347. 
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Figure 2. Gross National Products (millions of H) 
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Table 3. Consumer Price Index (period averages) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 lg64 lg65 1966 1967 1968 
35.0 37.3 39.2 38.2 38 .5 40 .1 44.0 42. 3 42 .1 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
52.8 61.3 62.9 66.5 74.8 100.0 124.3 148.3 176.0 195.6 
Source: IFSY 1982, IMF Publications, p. 345 . 
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Figure 3. Consumer Price Index (per iod averages) 
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Table 4. Unemployment 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
6.9 13. 7 15.l 16 . 8 20.8 20.9 26.6 20 .0 12.9 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
13.5 14 .4 15 .4 19.l 20.5 20.0 19.0 15.8 16 .7 
Source : 1969 Statistics, p. 110. 
1979/80 Statistics, p. 93. 
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Table 5. Total exports (millions of Naira, $1.00 = M0.68) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
350 346 364 410 462 578 599 521 467 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
954 1422 1522 2467 6244 5453 7840 8481 7373 
Source : r nterna t iona l Financial Statistics Yearbook 1982, IMF Publications, Washington, 
p. 347. 
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Table 6. Total 1mports (millions of Na1ra, $1.00 ~ M0.68) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
-487 -475 -486 -479 -587 -645 -639 -621 -561 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
-937 -1328 -1286 -u:;i8 -2743 -4988 -7074 -8787 -9590 
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Figure 6. Total imports (millions of Naira, $1 .00 = M0.68) 
1969 
-702 
1980 
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was N2901 and N420, respectively. 
Within this period in question, Nigeria imported little or no food 
items. In fact, they exported a lot of agricultural products . The boom-
ing agricultural production led the government to establish farm settle-
ments and providing each community with an agricultural officer who super-
vised the progress in the area as well as serve as an information link 
between the farmers and the government. 
2. Agricultural production and the state of 
the economy between 1970-1980 
Agricultural production declined sharply during the 1970-80 period, as 
seen in Table 1 and Figure 1. The reason for this decline will be made 
known as I proceed in this ana lys i s. With the passage of time, Nigeria and 
its peopl e continued to aspire for the ultimate goal--development. Though 
while the government pursued a different course, the people pursued anothe~ 
There was a large urban migration for better paying jobs that were located 
in the cities. This resulted in shortage of workers in the rural areas 
where agricultural production dominated the economy. The immediate result 
was a decrease in agricultural output. According to Wen (53) , Nigeria, 
once a grain exporter, had to spend Nl ,050 million to purchase grain in 
1980 . Grain now accounts for approximately 60% of Nigeria 1 s imports. 
It is not only the act ion of the rura l people that migrated the sole 
cause of the decrease in output, the government also helped to worsen the 
situation by adopting cheaper grain price policies in favor of consumers. 
This policy hurt the agricultural industry. The policy itself favors urban 
dwellers and farmers di sliked them and in effect tried to retaliate by 
20 
producing smaller quantities of output. It is because of the low grain 
production that rice imports, for example, were up from 1,700 tons in 1970 
to 700,000 tons in 1979 a whopping 698,300 tons increase with a drain on 
foreign reserve. Price supports were put into effect for the Nigerian 
agricultural producer. The price support limited grain imports, while 
raising the price of locally produced grain. The scarcity of grain forced 
the government to reopen importations and there was a massive increase in 
number of import licenses . For example, rice grown in Nigeria costs the 
consumer Nl,600 a ton in Nigeria while the United States ' Carolina rice 
was selling for N400 a ton in the world market . According to the Econo-
mist (17), protectionism for the Nigerian industries adopted by the 
government was very costly as can be seen from the price differential 
above. 
Nigeria has become a net importer of almost every agricultural prod-
uct it used to export. This is exemplified by the fact that one big palm-
oil firm that established pipelines a quarter of a century ago to run its 
products on to ships has now reversed the pumps and brings out of ships 
the palm-oil it so profitably grows in Malaysia. 
An alarming trend has been the rapid decline of the former thriving 
agricultural exports. The communities that depended on these exports for 
their livelihood are hit the worst. Optimists reckon that Nigerian food 
production is growing by approximately 0.5% a year while the population is 
growing much faster . In the words of the Economist (17), food now takes 
about 15% of total spending on imports and will be taking more each year. 
It should be recalled that in the last officially acceptable census in 
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Nigeria in 1963 estimated the population at 55.7 million . In 1979, the 
Nigerian estimate was 77.5 million and in 1981 most international 
organizations estimated Nigeria's population at 85.2 million people. 
Extrapolating, the officially estimated growth estimated at 2.5% would 
give a 1981 total of approximately 88 million. It should also be re-
called that the 1973 census in Nigeria which put the population at 79.7 
million was cancelled because of fraud of swollen numbers from some parts 
of the country. 
Kolo (25) said that there have been efforts recently by the 9overn-
ment to revitalise the agricultural sector by the establishment of agri-
cultural credit banks, improved land use and agricultural education and 
improvements in livestock, fisheries and forestry, so as to increase 
domestic food production without relaxing export efforts. Ekundare (6) 
reported that in the second National Development Plan of 1970-74, agri-
culture's share of the total expenditure of =EN780 million was ~Nl32.7 
million . This went to the National Agricultural Bank, land use improve-
ments, etc. Despite all these efforts, the main obstacle to the much 
needed agrarian revolution--the land tenure system still remains. 
According to Ekundare (6) the government recognizes the fact that "the 
prevailing land tenure system in the country sometimes hinders agricultural 
development .. As a result of the system of inheritance, land owned by 
individuals or extended families also tends to become fragmented and 
scattered, leading to the loss of much valuable time in cultivation. If 
Nigeria's agriculture is then to develop very rapidly and have the desired 
impact on the standard of living, there must be a reform in the system of 
land tenure." 
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The Nigerian government, according to Thompson (46, 47) has been 
spending extensively in agricultural projects in order to speed up the 
production of food items. As part of the Green Revolution, the government 
spent N400 million on the Hadejia River Basin Project and also spent 
Nl52.4 million and Nl24 million in Gongola and Berno states respectively 
between 1980-82 to boost agricultural production . A N7 million fisheries 
terminal with a production capacity of 200 tons of fish daily has been 
planned for Borikori in Port Harcourt, Rivers state . Since 1979, the 
government has invested over N2 bill i on to boost the food scheme on the 
Green Revolution Program. Imo state farmers have received about N2. 5 
million in loans to support agricultural programs, to name only a few. 
Agriculture contributed 64% of GDP in 1960; but in the 1977/ 78 
financial year, agriculture was only 14% of GDP, a drop of 50%. This is 
due to a tilt in the balance between the former economy supported by agri -
cultural production and the recent economy supported by oil production. 
It is also an indication that agricultural production has been neglected 
for a more profitable "short-term" oil wealth . In the words of Adejugbe, 
cited in Adani (1), 11 The decline in agricultural production and its falling 
contributions to GDP, reveals the gradual drop in income of the rural popu-
lation.11 It is estimated that two-thirds of the country's population live 
in rural areas, so the income imbalance can be seen. In order to reverse 
the trend of the decline in agriculture, the government introduced pro-
grams such as "Operation Feed the Nation" (OFN) and later on, the Green 
Revolution . OFN was introduced by mid-1970s and the Green Revolution by 
April 1980. The objectives of both programs were similar and aimed at the 
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same goa l . The objectives inlcude: (1) To increase the self-sufficiency 
of the agri cultural sector and to improve the welfare of the people in 
rural areas. (b) To boost agricultural production. (c) To ensure rural 
development of agro-based industries through the construction of feeder 
roads, the provision of housing, education and health facilities, water 
and electricity in the rural areas. 
Conmodity boards were formed for most crops. These include Rubber 
Board, Pa lm Produce Board, Cotton Board, Groundnut Board, Cocoa Board and 
Grains Board . A total of N864,000 was spent on the supply of inputs to 
rubber farmers and 66,000 hectares of land was earmarked for replanting or 
for new plantation. Over 184,000 palm seeds were supplied to farmers and 
500 Ma l aysian harvesting/pruning knives were purchased and resold to 
farmers at subsidized rates. It is expected that 3,000 more knives are to 
be purchased. The government has also financed seed multiplication pro-
grams for cotton in order to promote rural entrepreneurship, but the 
problem here is that farmers are pl anti ng more food crops to feed them-
selves instead of cotton for cash. Producer prices of groundnuts were in-
creased from N420 per ton to N450 per ton to encourage farmers to grow more 
goundnuts . For cocoa, a rehabilitation program was embarked upon and pro-
vision was made for spraying chemicals and other essential inputs . Grain 
projects which were undertaken include: 11 Adarice 11 in Enugu and "Riceco" 
in Jos. Trucks were purchased to transport grains, but the problem of 
inadequate financing remains. 
Other agricultural projects within this period, according to Nweke 
(33), include Dairy Development Program (livestock) to improve pastures 
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and the adoption of new techniques to increase milk production and arti-
ficial insemination. Poultry projects have also been encouraged. Three 
hatcheries were established in Kano, Ogun and Cross River states with a 
total production capacity of 5.4 million day-old chicks annually. Plans 
have also been made to purchase and distribute battery cages and birds at 
subsidized prices to small scale farmers. Broiler-processing plants and 
cold storage facilities are to be constructed at Agege in Lagos state and 
Port Harcourt in Rivers state to provide custom processing services to 
broiler farmers to reduce their business risks. 
The question to be asked is: What conditions led to these massive 
projects and programs. Looking back at Table 1 and Figure 1, the decline 
in agricultural production cannot be overemphasized. Cocoa, for instance, 
dropped 74% from 304.8 thousand metric tons (MT) in 1970 to 175 thousand 
metric tons in 1980. Groundnut declined 64% from 1581 thousand MT in 1970 
to 570 thousand MT in 1980. Palm-kernel increased only modestly from 315 
thousand MT in 1970 to 345 thousand MT in 1980 (a 9.5% increase). Despite 
all these declines in agricultural production, improvements have continued 
to be made in rice and cattle production. The limitation here, however, is 
that rice and catt le production are limited to certain monopolies of the 
areas of the country and large scale production of these items are basi-
cally government and foreign-backed corporations. Unemployment has con-
tinued to rise from 13.5% in 1970 to 16.7% in 1978, reaching an all time 
high for the decade in 1974 with a 20.5% unemployment rate. (See Figure 4.) 
Imports into the country were increasing on a geometric proportion as can 
be seen in Figure 6, from a debit of N937 million in 1970 to N9590 million 
in 1978--a whopping 923.4% increase, which signifies a drain in the foreign 
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exchange . 
It is important to note that all these declines did not take place 
abruptly. It was a gradual decline which was knowingly or unknowingly 
allowed to continue till it got out of hand. This was the situation of 
agricultural production and its impact on the general economy within the 
phase III period of my analysis . 
B. Oil Economy 
In this section, I will elaborate on the part oil production has 
played in the Nigerian economy. It is without doubt that the oil economy 
has been one of the greatest blessings as well as the most devastating 
tragedies in the Nigerian economy. This dual effect will be examined as 
they apply to both the phase II, as well as the phase III periods in my 
analysis. 
1. Oil production and the state of the 
economy between 1960-1970 
Although oil production in Nigeria had started by this period, its 
commercialization was still not feasible. It should be noted that in 
Nigeria, oil belongs to the government and not to individuals. Oil money 
was paid to the government and not to the people. The immediate result of 
this system was a growth in government jobs and of offices for government 
servants. As a result, people are disinterested in working on the farms 
in Nigeria, rather they prefer to look for government or government re-
lated jobs for which they have little or no qualifications. According to 
the Economist (16), "Oil has monstrously speeded up the rush to the towns 
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to work for the government, on government contracts , or to service those 
so employed." The blessin~s of oil, the Economist continued is that it 
brings in lots of money and the curse is that it concentrates that money 
in few hands. 
To put the condition into perspective, mining and quarrying (including 
oil production) contributed a mere 1.2% of GDP of N2493.4 million in 1960 
financial year . It should be noted that the oil economy in Nigeria did 
not assume any importance before independence in 1960, although the first 
export of crude oil was shipped in 1958. The rate of export has grown 
considerably since then. In 1960, petroleum exports accounted for N8 .82 
million, making up 2.6% of Nigerian total exports. Its relative importance 
was, therefore, negligible in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GOP). In 
the words of Adani (1), during the 1960-61 fiscal year, petroleum produc-
tion contributed Nl. 8 million or 1% of total government revenue. Crude 
oil thus accounted for 0.30% of GDP in 1960/61. Between 1937 and 1959, it 
was only Shell B-P Company (originally Shell D'Arcy) that was allowed to 
explore oil in Nigeria. By 1960, a liberalized policy was put into force, 
allowing other oil companies to participate in the oil exploration and 
to increase production for exports. These other companies include: Agip, 
Amoseas (now Texaco/Chevron), Gulf, Mobil and Safrap (now Elf). As a 
result of this policy, Nweke (33) contends that crude oil increased from a 
mere 857,000 metric tons in 1960 to 13.7 meillion MT in 1965, but with a 
minimal impact on the revenue. 
Generally, the nation ' s economy did not change much because during 
this period, agriculture was still the mainstay of the economy. 
As can be seen from Table 7 (15), the index number of period averages 
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7. Crude petroleum production (i ndex number of period averages) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
2.6 3.8 4.3 6.7 15.2 23.4 17.9 8 .0 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
87.2 102.0 115 .1 126. 3 100.0 116 .2 117 .3 106.9 129.2 
Source: IFSY 1982, IMF Publications, p. 345. 
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Figure 7. Crude petroleum production (index number of period averages) 
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Table 8. Crude petroleum (000 M.T. production) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 ~ 1967 1968 1969 
850 2,271 3,328 3,772 5,953 13,538 21,000 16,817 7,127 27,001 
1970 -11ZL ...lliL 1973 1974 -1..2.?.?.._ 1976 1977 ~ 1979 1980 ---
54,203 76 ,377 90,918 101 ,765 111,578 88,440 103,479 102.970 94,900 
Source : 1979/80 Statistics , p. 212 and p. 201. 
Average 1961-65 (5 , 772) 
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Figure 8. Crude petroleum (000 M.T. production) 
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using 1975 as a base year shows that crude petroleum production was 1% of 
1975 in 1960, stagnated until 1965 when it reached 15.2% of 1975, dipped to 
8% in 1968 and climbed to 30.2% of 1975 in 1969. The graph i s shown in 
Figure 7. Productionwise, the data show that in 1960, Nigeria produced 
850 thousand MT and with a gradual increase reached 27,001 thousand MT in 
1969. This is shown in Table 8 and Figure 8 (15). With regard to the 
price of petroleum, between 1960 and 1970, the fact remains that crude 
petroleum could not corrrnand a worthwhile price, being sold at less than 
$2.10 per barrel (see Table 9 and Figure 9). Thus, it is seen that 
petroleum production did not corrrnand much attention. Neither did it affect 
the economy much during the phase II period of my analysis. 
2. Oil production and the state of the 
economy between 1970-1980 
This was the oil-boom period in Nigeria. With the oil-boom came huge 
expenditures, huge revenues, corruption in a large scale and economic 
crisis in Nigeria. Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Oil enabled Nigeria to multiply its exports by 10 times 
in ten years and its imports by 11 times. In only two of the past ten years 
has Nigeria not recorded a surplus in its current balance of payments [see 
Table 10 and Figure 10 (15)]. According to the Economist (16), no country 
in the world has been so eager to buy more foreign goods and services and 
so well able to pay for them. During this period, the GNP composition re-
versed . In 1980 for instance, one quarter of the estimated GNP came from 
oil revenues. In 1970 , oil accounted for 58% of exports and 93% in 1975. 
Oil provided over 90% of the exports in 1980 and all the oil money went 
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Table 9. Price of crude oil {$s per barrel--monthly average ) 
1960-69 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
2 .1 2.65 2.8 4.47 12 .23 11.62 27.94 14 .48 14 . 1 20.08 33.91 
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Figure 9. Price of crude oil ($s per barrel--monthly average) 
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Table 10. Government finance, deficit (-) or surplus (+) (millions of Naira) 
1960-64 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
-78 .0 -47 .0 -123 .9 -177. 5 301.7 -118 .8 36.2 36.9 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
404.l 1,524.8 -1,513.4 -2,502.0 1,763 .5 
Source: IFSY 1982, IMF Publications, p. 347. 
25-
20-
Figure 10. Government finance, deficit (-) or surpl us (+) (millions of Naira) 
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straight to the government, forming 90% of its revenue. 
There was a lack of competence in carrying out the ambitious programs 
which were undertaken as a result of the huge revenue from oil. Produc-
tion licenses were given to foreigners and Nigeria was ineffectual as an 
OPEC member. There was a shortage of educated people to control the 
spending in Nigeria and there was also a lack of trained people to do the 
production work. Almost everything used in the construction of refineries, 
oil wells and other equipment was imported. It was also recorded that in 
1972-73 fiscal year, revenue from oil accounted for more than 50% of the 
total federal government revenue. A peak was hit in 1973 and 1976 when oil 
accounted for 81% of total federal government revenue contributing M5177 
million. 
As of now, 80% of both state and federal revenue comes from oil. Con-
tributions of oil to the GDP is, however, less important than its contribu-
tion to exports or government revenue. In 1977/78 fiscal year, crude oil 
component of GDP was 22.1%. According to Lubeck (29), out of a population 
of about 80 million people in Nigeria, less than 5,000 persons are engaged 
in oil production which is much less than 1% of the population. This is 
because the oil industry is highly captial intensive and requires highly 
specialized skills . Adani (1) contends that the actual employment figure 
for all categories of workers in Nigeria for 1974 stood at 4,838 people in 
the oil industry. The linkages with the rest of the economy is also very 
weak as a result of the low level of technology, of industrialization and 
the patterns of consumption. 
With the benefits of the oil economy came some problems. Among 
them are: (1) inflation caused by the injection of high powered money 
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into the economy as could be evidenced by the CPI which climbed from 
52.8% in 1970 to 217.9% in 1980--a whopping 165.1% increase in 10 years, 
using 1975 as a base year (see Table 3 and Figure 3); (2) unfavorable 
internal terms of trade for the rural sector vis-a-vis the urban sectors, 
(3) Urban labor migration, (4) Supply bottlenecks and financial manage-
ment by public institutions and (5) Periodic salary increases for workers 
without co!TiTiensurate productivity . Such periodic salary increases in-
cluded the famous 11 Udoji Awards" and the "Williams Awards." It should 
also be realized that government spending in Nigeria has been inflationary 
since a substantial portion of the expenditure has been going to the con-
struction of infrastructures such as bridges, roads and ports which needs 
the importation of almost every item used in such constructions, and also 
because of the number and size of such projects taken at a time. 
GNP in Nigeria jumped from N5125 million in 1970 to N28716 million 
in 1978, an increase of about 460% (see Table 2 and Figure 2). Unemploy-
ment as can be seen from Table 4 and Figure 4 started rising rapidly from 
13 . 5% in 1970 to 20.5% in 1974 and declining a bit to 16.7% in 1978. 
Steel consumption which serves as part of the construction items went from 
650 thousand MT in 1970 to 1365 thousant MT in 1978, an increase of 110% 
(see Table 11 and Figure 11). Total exports rose from N954 million in 
1970 to N8,481 million in 1977 and declining to N7,373 million in 1978 
(see Table 5 and Fi gure 5). Imports as can be seen from Table 6 and 
Figure 6 jumped from a debit of N937 million in 1970 to a debit of N9,590 
million in 1978. Crude petroleum production increased rapidly from 54,203 
thousand MT in 1970, reaching an all time high in 1974 with 111,578 
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Table 11. Steel consumption 
Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Total ( ' 00 metric ton ) 365 335 368 269 318 650 
Per-capita ( kil 0) 6 6 6 4 5 12 
Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Total ('000 metric ton) 710 884 1,380 1,327 1,799 
Per-capita (kilo) 12 14 22 20 26 
Expressed in tenns of crude steel 
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Figure 11. Steel consumpti on 
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Table 12. Government consumption (mill ions of N) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
141 154 169 165 192 222 225 215 252 420 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
578 631 798 819 1,122 2,623 3,083 3,587 3,634 
Source: IFSY 1982, IMF Publications, p. 347. 
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Figure 12. Government consumption (millions of N) 
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Table 13. Private consumption {millions of Naira) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
2,137 2,094 2, 164 2,457 2,574 2,590 2,828 2,352 2,283 2,901 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
4, 143 5,090 5,267 6,018 9, 109 12,378 15,265 16,491 18,289 
Source: lFSY 1982, IMF Publications, p. 347. 
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Figure 13 . Private consumption {millions of Naira) 
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thousand MT and then declining to 94,900 thousand MT in 1978. Crude 
petrol eum index (using 1975 as a base year) went from 60.7% in 1970 to 
126.3% in 1974 and declined to 115.7% in 1980 (see Figure 7) . Government, 
as well as private consumption shot up dramatically [see Tables and Figures 
12 and 13 (15), respectively]. The price of oil as can be seen in Figure 9 
f luctuated widely, peaking in 1976 and 1980. 
The reduction in the price of crude oil caused OPEC to reduce pro-
duction from 19 to 17.5 million barrels per day (bpd) and maintain a 
current price of $34.00 per barrel . The reason that was given for such a 
move was to cope with declining price of oil caused by the imbalance of 
supply and demand on the world oil market. Other reasons, according to 
Fu (8), include: pressure from superpowers as well as from Western oil 
companies. This move did not normalize things as demand for oi l on the 
world market declined approximately 26%, resulting in daily surplus of 
5- 7 million barrels . (OPEC oil output in 1975 was 30.77 million bpd in 
1979 and declined to 26.88 million bpd in 1980.) 
The revenue generated by oil in Nigeria was thus squeezed by foreign 
oil companies by cutting exports from Nigeria from a high of approximately 
2 million bpd in 1980, to a low of about 500,000 bpd. Nigeria lost some 
of its markets as a result of this meas ure. There was no formal credit 
squeeze, no sharp rise in local interest rates. Instead, the Federal 
government simply put off paying its bills and delayed authorization of 
remittances abroad. So, as can be seen from the above analysis, the 
1970-80 period was both a period of blessing, as well as a period of 
economic crisis in Nigeria. 
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III . POLICY FORMULATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this chapter, I will examine the policies of the Nigerian govern-
ment with regard to agricultural and oil production, how these policies 
were formulated, who were the key people involved in the formulation, the 
implementations of the po lici es in question, how the policies affected the 
masses of the people and the government itself and what would have been 
done differently. This chapter is, thus, trying to analyze the rationale 
behind those policies and to evaluate the most effective way of carrying 
them out, if they are economically justified . 
A. Government Policies on Agricultural 
and Oil Production 
As the period I am analyzing is a fairly continuous period, I decided 
to treat both periods together. Since the policies are a sort of over-
lapping to each other , this also gives me the advantage of treating them 
together as to find out what led to what. It will be noteworthy to keep 
in mind that Nigeria has had about five separate governments since 1960 . 
Putting these five governments into three general categories, we have : 
(1) the civilian government of 1960-66 which was a parliamentary democracy, 
(2) the military government of 1966-1979 which was a sort of dictatorial 
form of government and, finally, (3) the civilian government of 1979 to the 
present, which is a "copycat" of the United States presidential system. 
These three categori es of government have enacted varied policies regarding 
agricultura l and oil production . The years in question wi ll determine 
which government enacted what policy and help us to see the problem in its 
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entire perspective. 
Nigeria operates on development plans. The plan period might take up 
to six years to elapse. The first national development plan, 1962-68, 
stated that "the basic objective of planning in Nigeria is not merely to 
accelerate the rate of economic growth and the rate at which the level of 
the population can be raised; it is also to give her an increasing measure 
of control over her own destiny. 11 The second national development plan, 
1970-74, emphasizes: ''The present plan ... recognizes explicitly the 
possibilities of using planning as a deliberate weapon of social change 
by correcting defects in existing soc ial relations in various spheres of 
production, distribution and exchange. 11 The emphasis, according to 
Ekundare (6), in both development plans i s on soc ial change and on achiev-
ing and sustaining of social and political equilibrium and not merely 
acceleration of economic growth. 
The fundamental objective of the fir st national development plan is 
11 the achievement and maintenance of the highest rate of increase in the 
standard of living and the creation of the necessary conditions to this 
end, including public support and awareness of both the potentialities 
that exi st and the sacrifice that will be required." A 4% annual average 
rate of growth of GDP and a 2% to 2~% annual growth rate in population 
was projected. Overall performance was unsteady, going from 6.7% in 
1963/64 to 3.8% in 1964/65, and 5.7% in 1965/66 to 4.2% in 1966/67. 
In this plan, agriculture accounted for approximately 65% of GDP in 
1962/63 fiscal year and 63% of GDP in 1966/67 fiscal year. This decline 
was caused by a faster growth in the nonagricultural sector (e .g. growth 
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in local industries, encouraged by imposition of import restrictions). The 
share of industrial production in the GDP grew from 5.3% in 1962/ 63 to 7% 
in 1966/67 fiscal year. The mining sector grew and contributed 1.9% to 
3.4% to the GDP in 1962/63 and 1966/67, respectively. Major economic 
projects successfully completed within the plan period included: the oil 
refinery, the Niger dam, the Nigerian smelting and minting plant, the paper 
mill and the sugar mill. In the field of communications, the Niger bridge, 
port extensions and the construction of some major roads were successfully 
completed. 
The second national development plan has as its objectives the 
fundamentals of social change. These include: (1) a united, strong and 
self-reliant nation, (2) a great and dynami c economy, (3) a just and 
egalitarian society, (4) a land of bright and full opportunities for all 
its citizens and (5) a free and democratic society. These rhetorics 
formed the basis of policy making and of the expenditure in the country . 
Of course, from these two development plans, one could see that the poli -
cies were more social and political in nature than economic. 
Industries were sponsored by the government and the government gave 
itself the discretion as to what is in the public interest as far as agri-
cultural or industrial locations are concerned. In the words of Ekundare 
(6), it means in effect that even if the siting of an industrial or agri -
cultural project in a given area is uneconomical, but can help to promote 
political and social unity, the government may disregard those economic 
considerations which favor their establishment elsewhere . This policy 
is possible with government financed projects, but private projects 
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are not bound to follow this rule, especially those with foreign private 
capital. If incentives are introduced to lure firms to uneconomical 
locations, very high prices would have to be paid after production. 
The second national development plan, which is a broad based objec-
t ive and means of implementing development programs in the country 
according to Ekundare (6), recognizes the importance of education and man-
power training for both agricultural and oil production. ''Full employment 
of resources, especially of the labor force, is the necessary policy ob-
jective for any economy dedicated to rapid growth and social harmony . 
The essence of excess capacity means resource waste and lost economic 
opportunities which an economy like Nigeria's can ill afford. Vague plans 
as to what policy of full employment to pursue in all sectors of the 
economy including agriculture and oil characterize the policy formaliza-
tions in Nigeria within this period. Other problems associated with this 
vague policy were hightened by mobility of labor, caused by mistrust among 
various ethnic groups. Following regionalization policies of the 1950s, 
deliberate measures were taken, particularly down to 1956, to restrict the 
mobility of labor. The civil war and current political crisis seems to 
have worsened the situation. 
As far as government policies on agriculture and oil are concerned, 
the aim of the federal government agricultural policies was to aid local 
farmers. The Green Revolution program of the federal government was es-
tablished to assist the ordinary farmers to increase their rate of food 
production. As a result, according to Thompson (47), 15% of the budget was 
allocated to agriculture on a yearly basis . The revenue got from oil was 
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shared to states in the federation based on 11 derivation" principle. This 
principle states that the states where the oil is produced receives a larger 
share of the oil revenue. It has been echoed by Adani (1) that Nigeria's 
rural policy in the 1970s can be described as a policy of providing more 
for the able few, while the rural peop le go without. Fifty percent of the 
manufacturing establishments are concentrated in Lagos and the rest are 
found in about a dozen urban centers. Characterized by a high proportion 
of imported inputs, manufacturing and the oil economy are growing at a 
faster rate. 
The results of all these policies are: (1) indirect income that the 
use of local raw materials can provide is considerably reduced, (2) the 
development of other industries is reduced, and (3) there is a high cost 
to the economy because of the capital intensive nature of the manufacturing 
and oil industries. An irony to this is that while growth in investments 
in these industries was more than 22% per year, annual growth in unemploy-
ment was about 12% per year. In 1972 and 1977, Nigeria enacted the 
11 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree" (NEPD) which spelled out economic 
activities of percentage of foreign owned ventures in Nigeria . The ob-
jective of this decree is to enable Nigerians to fully participate in the 
modern sectors of the economy, especially the oil economy . Nigeria has 
been having runaway inflation for the last 15 years because of pol icies 
that have been implemented. By 1975/76, inflation want into double digit 
figures. (From 1970, there was an acute shortage of essential commodi-
ties.) Price control was put into effect but proved ineffective. Accord-
ing to Adani (1), the country has been relying more and more upon the 
import of food stuffs and hence inadvertently imports additional inflation 
to reinforce the domestically induced one. 
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It should be realized that the size of the Nigerian labor force has 
steadily been rising since 1960. Today it is conservatively estimated at 
32 . 7 million (about one-third of the entire population). The labor force 
is made up of people aged 18-40 years (with a generous cluster of children 
aged 7-17 years). The 18-40 year age bracket is based on the life expect-
ancy of people in Nigeria. This does not preclude the fact that in reality 
the labor force might include the range of 18-60 year olds. According to 
Clinton (4), 1966 statistics showed that 73.27% of the labor force was il -
literate, while only 0.88% was educated up to and above the school certifi -
cate level. This sapped the potentials of the labor force where great 
skills were needed. From all these statistics one would question the poli-
cies of the government especially with regard to education for the improve-
ment of agricultural and oil production. 
The military government made changes in policies which drastically 
reduced the capital allowance to oil companies in an attempt to obtain 
more revenue from oil. In January 1967, they issued a decree requiring 
oil companies to be incorporated under government control. In 1969, 
"petroleum decree" defined petroleum to include gas and reduced the length 
of concession period given to oil companies to 20 years . This decree also 
provided for a 51% state "participation" in all new concessions and re-
quired all producing companies not only to produce a master plan for oil 
exploitation, but also to accelerate the "Nigerianization" of their most 
senior positions and other cadres to 75% and 100%, respectively, within 
the next 10 years. 
In 1971, a decision was made to offer no concessions to private inter-
ests whatsoever, but instead to encourage the public sector "participation" 
in the industry through negotiations. In October 1973, Nigeria took 
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advantage of the Arab-I sraeli war and oil was supplied to those embargoed. 
This was a change in policy, though the price of oil quadrupled. 
In 1978, 11 decree No . 611 was issued, otherwise known as 11 Land Use 
decree. 11 This decree stipu l ates the co nditi ons governing the control and 
use of land in every state or local government area of the country . It 
provides that land in every state in the federation is to be he ld in trust 
by the state government on behalf of the people of the state. It stipu-
lates that the right of a member of the community to use land and to enjoy 
its fruits should be ensured, protected and preserved by the state or 
local government as the case may be. Other provisions of this decree in-
clude: management of land, resettlement of persons affected by the 
revocation of rights of occupancy on the grounds of overriding public 
interest, determination of disputes as to the amou nt of compensation 
payab le under this decree. Powers to ensure this provision were given to 
the Land Use Al locat ion Committee. 
As far as the agricultural policies in Nigeria are concerned, the 
objective was to increase agricultural output substantially as a weapon 
against malnutrition and as a means of improving the standard of living of 
the people. This would be done by: (1) providing farmers with fertil -
izers, pesticides and other agricultural inputs at heavily subsidized 
prices, (2) providing tractor hire services and land development schemes at 
at government expense, (3) through the Nigerian Agricultural Bank (with 
the headquarters in Kaduna) by opening branches in various parts of the 
country , (4) providing bold schemes for storage facilities, particularly 
strategic grain reserves and farm to market roads in rural areas in every 
part of the country, (5) operating a commodity marketing system which 
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consists of price-fixing authority and seven commodity boards, covering 
the key food crops as well as the traditional export crops on a nation-
wide basis. The boards are to encourage production of crops it handles 
and organizes their marketing for local consumption and in some cases , 
for local processing before export and helps to stabilize the price of 
food grains while at the same time guaranteeing reasonable prices and 
incomes to the farmers. 
The federal government also established the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and charged it with the responsibility for 
looking after the governments interests in the oil industry . It also 
engages in the exploration, drilling, production, refining and explora-
tion of oil. According to Nweke (33), the NNPC i s also responsible for 
the insta ll ation of depots at strategic points to facilitate the distribu-
tion of refined petroleum and minimize oil shortages . Two refineries have 
been established in Port Harcourt and Warri for production of motor oils, 
gaso l ine and kerosene . The third refinery is being bui lt in Kaduna and 
there are plans to build more for the export market. It should be realized 
that Nigeria is the sixth largest producer of crude petroleum in the world 
and the second in Africa . 
Another policy that directly affected the oil and agricultural economy 
is that of revenue allocation principles. This is a system whereby the 
entire revenue generated in the country is allocated to the 19 states of 
the federation. This revenue allocation system is based on three prin-
ciples, viz., Princ i ple of Derivation, Principle of Need and Principle of 
National interest (Phillips, 37): 
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Principle of Derivation This principle requires that all revenue 
which can be identified as having come from or can be attributed to a 
particular state should be allocated to it, based on adequate and reliable 
data. 
Principle of Need This requires that revenue be allocated to 
states based on the urgency and the need for the revenue . 
Principle of National Interest This is intended to achieve a 
delicate balance between equity on the one hand and the needs of national 
economic and political growth and stability on the other. 
During the 1970-80 period, the federal government instituted policies 
that were very weak. They showed no understanding of the economy and 
how it works . The Udoji and Williams awards which increased salaries 
favored only about 10% of the entire population. The policies also facili-
tated the rush to urban centers. It should be realized that the states 
have no significant revenue other than what the federal government gives 
them out of its oil takings. In February 1981, for instance, a revenue 
allocation bill was signed into law by the President. The formula was 
based on the following: (1) the federal government keeps 58.5% of the 
total . (2) the states get 31.5%, each state's share being based on 
its area, population and oil production. (3) local governments within 
the states woul d get 10%. This policy was thrown out by the courts. A 
more generous bill to the states has been passed, but the total to be 
shared is unknown . According to Knight (17), the Central Bank's annual 
report for 1980 wryly complained: "As was the case in calendar year 1979, 
the federal government's fiscal operations in 1980 could not be analyzed 
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due to the unavailability of actual revenue and expenditure statistics 
during the year. 11 
Basically, agricultural programs that have been tried include: The 
National Accelerated Food Program (NAFP) in 1973, Operation Feed the 
Nation (OFN) in 1976 and The Green Revolution of 1980. These programs were 
all meant to increase agricultural production in the country, as well as 
help to curb the massive exodus of people from the rural areas . Banks 
were instructed to lend 8% of their total loans for approved agricultural 
projects . In 1978, a different land tenure system was introduced by the 
military government. Ownership of land was vested to state governments. 
This, in effect, means that farmers cannot use land as a collateral for 
loans. Large irrigation and land clearance schemes were initiated by the 
government. Minimum wage was raised from N70 per month in 1979 to Nl50 
per month. The exchange rate of the Nigerian Naira was kept as near as 
is possible stable in terms of the U.S. dollar and the British pound 
sterling. (Nl = t0.83 or $1.59). In all, Nigeria engaged in gigantic 
projects and programs and committed a huge amount of funds to implement 
them. 
B. Implementation of Government Policies 
Most of the policies enacted by the government in Nigeria, especially 
with regard to agricultural and oil production seem plausible, 
one thing is to formulate and enact a policy and another thing is to 
implement the policies in question. With the formulation of the policies, 
a lot of bureaucratic structures were created. As the case is in Nigeria, 
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the more bureaucrats you have to go through to get something done, the 
higher the cost of the project. Bribery became, for Nigeria, a 
national pastime . It has been suggested that meeting the needs of the 
extended family system, including vil l age and community links, are the 
major reasons for bribery in Nigeria. In the words of Knight (17), "the 
man who takes bribes sees himself as Robin Hood, not the wicked sheriff . " 
Foreigners soon adopted and practiced this policy in their dealings with 
Nigerian government and contractors. The most threatening problem with 
regard to policy implementation in Nigeria is corruption. In 1975 alone, 
over 11,000 personnel rang i ng from state governors to cooks were dis-
missed because of widespread corruption. Ten out of twelve state governors 
of the Gowan mi l itary regime were fo und guilty of appropriating a total 
sum of $16 mi l lion for their private use . Lubeck (29) also testified to 
this. The long- term implications of collective corruption are more 
worrying to the average citizen . This is a major problem to the imple-
mentation of the policies in question. 
Other problems, according to Nwosu (34 ) , to implementation include: 
(1) physical infrastructure, as the transportation network in Nigeria is 
still below standard for such economic growth and development; (2) 
organizational resources, since manpower development in Nigeria i s sti l l 
at the embryo stage; (3) corruption, s ince everyone thinks that it is 
a way of life and normal business practice; and (4) outmoded agri-
cultural technology. 
Physical infrastructure: In 1970, there was a total length of 
55,000 miles of roads in Nigeria and only 10,000 miles were properly paved. 
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In turn, there were about 67,000-79,000 vehicles, 28,000-30,000 trucks 
and 31,000-38,000 motorcycles, excluding bicycles. This showed the in-
adequacy of the roads for the traffic, hence lots of traffic delays and 
jams on major roads. 
The railway in Nigeria was established in 1898 and made a statutory 
corporation in 1959. It has operated on a deficit in all but one of the 
past 15 years. Its freight liftings declined substantially from 850,000 
tons in 1958-59 to 350,000 in 1970-71. Operations further declined sub-
stantial ly between 1971-74, and deficits increased (see Table 14). 
Table 14. Nigerian railway deficits, 1969-74 
Year Deficit Nmi llions 
1969- 70 10.3 
1970-71 15.8 
1971-72 22 .2 
1972-73 21 .8 
1973-74 23.1 
Source: The Federal Republic of Nigeria {45) . 
The causes of these deficits were attributed to poor management, the 
civil war whereby the corporation lost 6,000 employees of various skills, 
obsolete track system (the present route was built between 1898 and 1965), 
defects of diesel engines, a heavy backlog of repairs and maintenance work, 
extensive detention time at stations, poor facilities for passengers and 
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unreliable communication system. 
The Port Authority and National Shipping Line, established as a statu-
tory corporation in 1955, owns and manages six harbors with twenty-nine 
berths, with eighteen of them in Lagos, eight in Port-Harcourt, one each in 
Calabar, Burutu and Koko. Here also there is inadequate management. This 
can be shown by the data available that in October 1975 over 400 ships 
were awaiting offloading at Lagos as Lubeck (29) testified. This situation 
causes problems for exporters, importers and customs. Port delays averaged 
five to six weeks for cargo ships throughout 1975. 
The Nigerian Airways Corporation established in 1959 has a monopoly 
of all domestic air services . It also operates internationally. The 
i rony about the whole set up is that the corporation has only eleven air-
crafts: five Fokker 27s, two Boeing 707s, two Boeing 737s and two 
Fokker 28 jets according to Lubeck (29). There are a lot of management 
problems within the corporation. One cannot imagine how important 
economic policies can be implemented with all this chaos. Transportation 
systems in a country help to facilitate economic progress by the time and 
bulk factor. When this element is missing, there is a question as to how 
development is to progress . 
. 
Manpower-wise, since only 0.88% Nigerians are educated up to and above 
the school certificate level, one would expect a massive education program 
to bridge the illiteracy gap. It is estimated that the total high level 
manpower supply for 1975-1980 would be 43,550 persons. The breakdown is 
shown in Table 15. For a five-year period, manpower supply was still very 
inadequate, taking into consideration the population of 80 million people 
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Table 15. Anticipated source of high-level manpower supply, 1975-80 
Source 
1. 1975-80 graduates from local universities 
2. Supply from local non-university institutions 
3. Supply of graduates from overseas institutions 
4. Other external supplies of qualified Nigerians 
5. Supply through upgrading from intermediate category 
TOTAL 
Anticipated 
Number 
28,000 
4,000 
1,900 
3,000 
6,650 
43,550 
Source: The Federal Republic of Nigeria . Third National Development 
Plan, 1975-80, Vol. 1, Lagos, Federal Ministry of Economic 
Development, p. 378. 
and the urgent work of taking over the high level positions in the oil and 
agri cultural sectors of the economy, as well as engaging in a facilitated 
research and production of essential corrrnodities in Nigeria. 
The points mentioned above have been some of the drawbacks of policy 
implementation in Nigeria. The policies no matter how sound and excellent 
they are cannot proceed effectively without adequate implementation instru-
ments. It is on this fact that Nigeria should reexamine her policy imple-
mentation instruments. 
C. Economic Analysis and 
Impact of Government Policies 
In this section, I will try to analyze the economic impacts of the 
policies which have been enacted by all the governments in Nigeria since 
1960 . Consider the revenue allocation principles for instance . When 
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fully applied, the principle of derivation is likely to lead to greater 
interregional economic disparity and to contribute to the instability of 
the federation. The principle of need is likely to divert resources in 
order to even out disparities between sections of the country. It might 
lead to resentment by richer regions who may complain at having to subsi-
dize the poorer regions . It might harbor a politically destabilizing 
element and the poorer regions may loose the incentive to increase their 
tax efforts to raise revenue on their own. It is also very difficult to 
ascertain "need." The principle of national interest is weak because of 
uncertainty of its interpretations. It has, therefore, been suggested by 
Phillips (37), that a combination of the three principles would be pref-
erable since none is particularly complete individually without bias. 
It is because of government policies on oil production and the in-
creasing number of oil exporting countries that has led to overproduction 
and price declines respectively. In the western oil market for instance, 
the price per barrel has decreased from $40 a year ago to the present $28 
per barrel. The policies on oil induced the west, who is the major in-
dustrial consumers of oil to cut back on costs by saving energy . The west 
has also come up with alternative sources of energy (e.9.9 ·solar and nuclear), 
and this had led to cutbacks on imports. According to Fu (8), oil consump-
tion in the seven major western countries declined 23% during the past 
three years . 
With the spending autonomy given to states, especially on capital 
projects, the states have become big spenders on roads, offices, colleges, 
waterworks, etc. This was well put by the president's advisor on economic 
affairs whom Knight (17) quoted as saying that, "To draw up expenditure 
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plans that exceed a state's revenue resources by more than 100% is not 
only prodigal but is tantamount to fiscal irresponsibility." The problem 
of inefficiency in government hinges on the fact that Nigeri a runs the 
American system of government but operates on the British colonial 
bureaucracy. This has caused a lot of chaos as to how the protocols are 
to be followed. 
The agricultural programs and policies that have been introduced in 
the country like the National Accelerated Food Production (NAFP), the 
Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) and the Green Revolution are excellent in 
themselves, but since they are under federal government control, have the 
tendency of creating more civil servants and urban office blocks to house 
them. Thousands of tons of fert i lizers and tens of thousands of farm 
implements have been given out to farmers. Tractor pools have been tried 
and failed. There has been irrigation for rice (especially in the north 
near Lake Chad) . Some drainage and bush clearing in the southern rain 
forest have been implemented, but the results have not been good because 
the prices offered to farmers in rural areas have lagged miles behind what 
they can earn in the towns as small traders or as government servants. It 
should be realized that large irrigation and land clearance schemes demand 
large-scale management and foreig n expertise in Nigeria. The latest set of 
investment rules allow foreigners to own up to 60% of the agricultural 
enterprises, and an intergovernmental commission has been set up with the 
United States to promote investment from these. 
It is sad that no qualified Nigerian wants to help the small scale 
farmers to improve their outputs (especially in accounting and 
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organization). This is because there are more lucrative jobs in urban 
areas. With regard to finance and total organization of the farms, the 
Economist in Knight (17) writes: "World Bank gives technical assistance 
that goes with World Bank loans. What the bank cannot do is to ensure 
that farmers get attractive off- farm prices for their produce. Better 
roads, better seeds and better husbandry make increased production 
technically possible. But the farmers will not take up the possibilities 
unless they get good money for their crops. The governments main agri-
cultural priorities so far have been to keep food prices down, to satisfy 
the growing populations of the towns. 11 
In trying to protect local industries in Nigeria by adopting price 
control policies, l oca lly produced goods in Nigeria are more expensive than 
imported ones. Practically all Nigerian exports , now being oil, are 
priced in dollars. At least one-fifth of the official imports are priced 
in Sterling. So Nigeria's even more rapid (but unme;§ured) inflati on has 
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not been reflected in a relative decline of the value of its own currency 
since the exchange rate has been so high in comparison to most countries of 
the world . Foreign produced goods have become steadily cheaper in Naira 
tenns. By trying to keep the exchange rate at par with major developed 
tuntries' currency, the exchange rate policy has kept imported materials rtificially cheap and has helped t~the market for Ni gerian farmers tween 1976 and 1980, domestic food production was probably static, thus , 
food imports rose by 250% according to Knight (17). 
The oil policy not only had negative effects but also positive ones . 
This could be explained by the fact that between 1971-1974, oil revenue to 
Nigeria came up to NS,610 mi ll ion . In the words of Nweke (33), "Nigerian 
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foreign exchange reserve soared. Oil industry alone accounted for 86% of 
foreign exchange earnings in 1974 as compared with only 11% in 1965. 
Gross Domestic Product recorded an average growth rate of approximately 
8.9% per annum between 1975-76 and 1977-78. There was a surplus of H42.6 
million in 1975; but in 1976 and 1977, a deficit of H259.3 million and 
N656.5 million, respectively, was witnessed. Inflation rate in 1976 as 
reflected by the composite Consumer Price Index (CPI) reached 24% but was 
lowered in 1977 to 11% due to other counter pol icies taken during the 
year. Oil production declined from an average of 2.15 million barrels 
per day by 1974-75 to 1.94 million bpd by 1977-78. 
On a general basis, therefore, government policies had both positive 
and negative impacts on the economy. The reality of the situation is that 
with the mounting deficits and the decline in both agricultural and oil 
production, these policies have never been adequately analyzed before they 
were imrlemented. Though some of them are economically feasible and 
plausible, others are not even close to being an economic policy. 
D. Alternatives for Economic Revitalization 
It has been advocated by eminent economists like Heady (9, p. 29-35) 
that agriculture supplies capital for the development of other sectors. 
According to Heady, "In traditional societies, productivity of agriculture 
must progress more rapidly than population in order that the entire labor 
force is not required to provide food and shelter for the nation .'' Among 
the policy instruments that Heady advocates are: (1) supply of credit at 
prices which allow a recombination of farm units into s izes and a degree 
of specialization consistent with modern farm technology and the stage of 
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economic development , (2) legislation, and (3) purchase of small or 
inadequate farms by the public, with their conversion to nonfarm uses. 
Heady also identified three ultimate ends of agricultural pol icy which in-
clude: (1) to provide conditions which continue the contribution of agri -
culture to economic progress, (2) to provide prices, income and other 
compensation conditions which guarantee that the resulting income and 
welfare outcome to farmers is positive and finally (3) to provide equality 
of opportunity to farm people especially youth, to parti cipate in the 
economy-wide facets of economic growth. So far the effective pursuance 
of agricultural policies, governments should consider both the policy 
instruments as well as the ultimate ends as expoused by Heady in the 
formulations of t heir individual national policies. 
Other things that have been suggested, particularly for Nigeria to 
turn its economy around, is the devaluation of its currency. Knight (18) 
reports t hat Niger i an commerical banks have been ordered not to issue any 
new letters of credit for imports or accept requests for the release of 
foreign exchange. This has caused a lot of probl ems to industries relying 
on imports for most of their inputs as well as for Nigerian students over-
seas. This alternati ve is, therefore, having an adverse effect on the 
country and its peop l e rather than being a measure of strengthening the 
economic crisis. Nigerian Central Bank reserves fell from about$10 billion 
in January 1981 to $1.7 billion in March 1982. By September 1981, net debt 
to foreign corrmercial banks was $2.3 billion, against net deposits of 
about $2 billion a year earlier. It is a cash rather than a credit crunch 
since by the Third World standards, Nigeria is still rich . 11 Its debt 
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service ratio, i . e., the proportion of export earnings it must pay its 
creditors each year is on ly 6%11 according to Knight (20); therefore, the 
Euro-markets are open to it for possibl e loans. 
It might be proper to consider tarrifs because of the revenue it 
would bring for the government. It might also be more efficient to ad -
min i ster since it requires far fewer bureaucrats to administer than other 
agencies formed to handle such affa irs. There has been a 12~% cut in 
salaries of government workers, including that of the President and 
Federal Ministers . Other measures that have been taken include: (1) 
Ensuring that the need to claim overseas travel allowances was reduced to 
the barest minimum by reduction in the frequency of overseas conferences 
and the duration of stay . (2) An across the board reduction in the normal 
estacode rate (This would apply to all political office holders in the 
executive branch, including chairmen and board members of statutory 
corporations.) as seen in Thompson (46). These are all short-term mea-
sures which might even backfire on the government if care is not taken. 
Taken for granted that they succeed , it would not even make a dent on the 
huge deficit in Nigeria. 
One of the alternatives to insure high agricultural productivity is 
to implement research findings. Taking cocoa for example, according to 
Oni and Olayemi (35), the amount of cocoa planted in any given year is 
determined by the expected real producer prices of cocoa and the substi -
tute crop, the existing stock of trees, the age of distribution of the 
existing trees, the available area for further planting and the changing 
technology involved in cocoa cultivation . The most damaging thing in 
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Nigeria is that research findings such as the one above will never be put 
to practice. I think it is time Nigerians started adopting research find-
ings . 
There should also be a coordination of federal financial plann ing 
from the economic development planning. This would ensure equity in the 
revenue allocation system in Nigeria and also prevent the problem whereby 
in the 1970-74 development plan. Six states enjoyed large budget surplus 
while others suffered large deficits to the point of not being able to 
pay their workers. Phillips (37) re-echoed this strategy. 
Efforts should be made to involve the private sector in the indus-
trial development. The statutory corporations should be better served as 
private companies rather than as government bureaucracies. This will 
eliminate the inefficiencies that now obtains in them. Moreover, the 
companies will not have political overtones as they do now. Ridding the 
corporations of political control will go a long way to solving most of 
the problems involved in the management, organization and control of the 
corporations. In the words of Ekundare (6), 11 It is becoming evident in 
developing countries that government financed projects alone cannot 
bring nearer the moment of economic 1 take-off 1 and of self-sustaining 
growth. 11 
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IV. DATA ACQUISITION 
This section is intended to quantitatively validate what I have 
qualitatively already discussed. Most importantly, singling out oil pro-
duction as the independent variable and some other measures in the economy 
as the dependent variables will help clarify the extent of the economic 
mismanagement by both the government, as well as the people of Nigeria. 
Two subheadings will be used in this section, namely: materials and 
methods and test procedure. 
A. Materials and Methods 
The materials (data) used in this research are all secondary data 
mainly from world organizations such as the United Nations, Food and 
Agricultural Organization, International Monetary Fund, United States 
Government publications, Nigerian Government publications, and from pre-
vious research done by i nterested individuals on the topic in question. 
These secondary data were used primarily because of the nature of the re-
search dating back to 1960. Since it is almost very difficult to ascertain 
the most accurate data from the list of statistical data available, I de-
cided to adopt the statistical data of the United Nations and that of the 
International Monetary Fund, specifically in my quantitative analysis 
because of their world-wide appeal. It should be realized that in most 
developing countries, objective data is hard to come by. In effect, most 
research done on these countries has to rely either specifically on primary 
data or on secondary data. Some of the limitations which made me favor 
the use of secondary data include: distance, time, and finance. It is 
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my belief that the materials used here are also used for standard policy 
making regarding Nigeria by international bodies, which makes the accuracy 
of this research fairl y objective and valid. 
A hypothesis is advanced to verify if oil production has improved 
Nigerian economy or not, and if the economy is better now with the oil 
economy of the 1960s. Using 1960-1970 as a base year, 1970-1980 will be 
evaluated. Some variables that will be used include: Gross National 
Product (GNP), Consumer Price Index (CPI), Government Consumption, Private 
Consumption , total imports, and cocoa production as a representative of 
agricultural production. These variables will be plotted against oil pro-
duction and a least squares regression will be used to estimate the trend 
and possible pol icy implications in the future since the research is 
focused on learning about the past trend to be able to effectively predict 
the future and to control the deep troughs as well as the very high peaks. 
From the estimated predictions, correlations will be calculated and a 
"T" test will be applied to ascertain the validity of the result at the 
5% level of significance. The results of the test will, therefore, add a 
different dimension to the research which will prove that estimated pre-
dictions are better adopted as policy instruments for the economy rather 
than let political rhetoric s dictate policy formu l ations or even worse, 
use nothing to formulate policies . 
B. Test Procedure 
SAS computer program i s used to evaluate each variable individually 
with oil production since oil is the mainstay of the economy, to be able to 
predict what the situation will be in the future. Some assumptions are 
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made in this test. They include: (1) Oil production will continue to be 
the mainstay of Nigerian economy. (2) The price of oil will not go below 
$20 a barrel. (3) The use of oil as a source of energy for industrial pro-
duction will always be preferred to other substitutes. (4) Oil production 
in Nigeria will not decline below 500,000 barrels per day in the next 15 
to 20 years. (5) The supply and demand forces in the market are not vio-
lated . Observations from 1960-80 are recoded as years 1-21 . 
Each variable is analyzed separately to see the strength of the re-
lationship as well as to test formulated hypotheses. A prediction equa -
tion is then established to help policy makers in the future. 
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V. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
A. Gross National Product and Oil Production 
In this section, GNP from 1960 to 1980 is deflated to 1975 prices 
(see Table 16) and graphed in Figure 14a . A mathematical relationsh i p of 
GNP to time is calculated. This mathematical relationship is considered 
important because of its ro le in predicting future GNPs. A look at 
Figure 14b (deflated GNP) will indicate a parabolic curve, and following 
the procedure in Nickerson (31, p. 71) the equation for a parabolic curve 
is gi ven by: 
where y = GNP 
X = year 
a = intercept 
Y = a + bX + cX 2 + E 
b and c = parameters to the estimated regression 
r = error term. 
A regression is run on the deflated GNP. The model and procedure 
follow the Nickerson method. The regres sion equation for GNP is found 
to be : 
Y = $7,447.50 + 809 .17X + 93.60X2 + r• (origin 1969) 
This equation can be used to predict what the value of GNP would be in any 
given year. It will, thus, help policy makers to make an estimate of GNP 
for short term planning. 
The question that arises here is why was oil production made the sole 
contributor to GNP by the government? The fact that oil is an exhaustible 
and nonrenewable resource would have brought to the attention of pol icy 
makers that wh i le it should command an important role in the contribution 
to GNP, other sectors of the economy also should be developed. The huge 
63 
Table 16. GNP in current and 1975 prices for the years 1960-80 
Reported GNP CPI Deflated GNP 
Year (mill ion N) ( 1975=100) (mi 11 ions) 
1960 2,401 35.0 6,860 
1961 2,373 37.3 6 ,361. 9 
1962 2,526 39.2 6,443.9 
1963 2,192 38.2 7,623 
1964 3,127 38.5 8 , 122 
1965 3,302 40 . 1 8,234.4 
1966 3,532 44.0 8,027 .3 
1967 2,869 42.3 6,782.5 
1968 2,802 42.1 6,655.6 
1969 3,682 46.4 7,935.3 
1970 5,125 52.8 9,706.4 
1971 6,853 61.3 11,179.4 
1972 7,133 62.9 11,340 . 2 
1973 7,133 62.9 12,631.6 
1974 16,586 74.8 22,173.8 
1975 20,059 100.0 20,059 
1976 24,522 124 .3 19,728 .1 
1977 27, 772 148.3 18,726 .9 
1978 28 '716 176.0 16,315.9 
1979 195.6 
1980 217.9 
174,692 194,856.29 
30,000-
28,000-
26 ,000-
24,000-
22 , 000-
20,000-
18,000-
16,000-
14,000-
12,000-
10,000- _-.. ... - .. ... 
8,000-
6,000-
4 ,000-
2,000-
0 
60 65 
' ' ' 
64 
' / 
I 
I 
Year 
I 
I 
I 
I 
·-I 
70 
I -
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
75 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
-- <..t 11- ll E,.. I 
- - - -- ()£(LA T ( ./) 
I 
80 
Figure 14a. Gross National Product in current and deflated Naira 
2 :> 
::' I 
20 
1 •• 
l 'i 
G 
R 
0 l 7 
s 
s 
l <, 
N 
A 
T l ') 
I 
0 
N 1 .. 
A 
L 
l ~ 
p 
R 
0 1 ;" 
n 
u 
c 11 
r 
1 0 
, 
'i 
7 
r, 
65 
P L OT OF" Y •T LEGE~D ! ~ : 1 08~ • 0 = 2 OAS , E f C . 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
• 
. 
• 
• 
I 
I . 
I 
I 
• 
. 
• 
• 
. 
. 
---·-----·-----·-----·-----·-----·----·-----·-----·-----·---
1 9 &0 1 9&2 1 9&4 1 9&6 1 96 A 1 970 1 972 1 9 74 1 97& 1978 
YEAR 
Figure 14b. Plot of Gross National Product and time 
66 
revenue from oil could have served the basis for developing other sectors. 
The fact that oil production is on the decline in Nigeria now is basically 
because oil production and use is influenced by alternative sources of 
energy as well as by price. Since oil consumption itself is influenced 
by the level of industrialization of a particular country, thi s should have 
sent a signal to policy makers to diversify their export of oil to as many 
of the industrialized nations as possible, instead of concentrating the 
exports to a particular country. In this case, there would be stability 
in income earnings because one country alone cannot significantly affect 
the export price and policy in Nigeria. 
B. Total Imports and Oil Production 
Since total imports rose dramatically during the oil production 
period, a regression is also run on the two variables with total imports 
as the dependent variable and oil production as the independent variable. 
A look at Figure 15 indicates an exponential function of the form 
where E1 = random error 
bp. 1 
g = ae 1E 
pi = independent variable (oil production) 
a and b = parameter estimates 
e = natural log function. 
Linearizing the equation, we get: 
If we let M = 
80 = 
81 = 
El = 
lng 
l na 
b 
l nE l 
l ng 
bp. 1 
= ln(ae 1 E ) 
= lna + bp. + lnE1 
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Then we have a straight line linear model of the form: 
1 M = 8
0 
+ e1P1 + E 
This regression model above as used in Mendenhall and Reinmuth (30, p. 432) 
A 
is applied to provide a prediction equation for total imports (M) as 
follows: 
A 1 
M = .45 + .021P1 + E 
This equation defines the relationship of oil production to total imports. 
The standard error of the estimate, denoted by S (Table 17), which 
measures the average disparity between the actual and estimated values 
of the variable M is found to be .00279. It should be noted that the 
standard error S can be regarded as an indication of how well the regres-
sion equation describes the relationship between the two variables. If S 
is small, the actual and estimated values of M must be reasonably close, 
and the regression equation is a good description of the relationship. If 
S = 0, the actual and estimated values of M must have been identical, and 
the regression equation is a perfect description of the relationship . A 
large value for S means a large disparity between the actual and the esti-
mated values of M, and the regression equation is regarded as a poor 
description of the relationship between the two variables. 
In this present case, S i s found to be .00279, which indicates a close 
relationship between oil production and total imports. With the regression 
A 
equation as M = .45 + .021P1, we may now predict M for a given value of P1 
by referring to the plotted regression. For example, with a projected oil 
production of 88.4 million M.T . , 
A 
M = 2.3064 billion Naira. 
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Figure 16 shows the observed and predicted values for total imports for all 
the data set . 
The practical question we pose concerns the value of B1, which is the 
average change in M for a 1 unit change in P1. Stating that Mand P1 are 
not linearly related is eauivalent to saying that s1 = 0. Formulating 
a hypothesis to test this result, the null hypothesis would be: Ho: s1 = 0, 
while the alternate hypothesis would be: Ha:s1 f 0. Doing a t test for 
the analysis at a = .05, we reject Ho when the test statistic t > 2.110 or 
t < -2.110 (i.e . , the critical value). A value of 7.502 is obtained for 
the test statistic t (see Table 17). Observing that the test statistic 
exceeds the critical value oft, we reject the null hypothesis that 
s1 = 0, and conclude that there is evidence to support the theory that 
total imports is linearly related to oil production, with a 95% confidence 
limit of .021 ± .025. 
The coefficient of correlation on the other hand is a measure of 
linear correlation and is commonly used as an indicator of the strength 
of the linear relationship between the two variables, P1 and M, that will 
be independent of their respective scales of measurement. It should be 
realized that the standard error is affected by changes in the units of M. 
It is for this reason that it is not regarded as a good measure of the 
degree of relationship. What is needed instead is a measure that is ab-
s tract and unaffected by any change in the units in which M is measured. 
Such a measure is called correlation coefficient and is indicated with the 
notation 'r'. The value for r here is found to be 0.87 . It is important 
to note that a positive value for r implies that the lines slope upward to 
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the right (see Figure 15). The value for the ratio of explained variation 
to total variation, which expresses the proportion of the variation in M 
which is associated with or related to the variation in P1 is given by r
2 
and is called the coefficient of determination. The value here is found 
to be 0.76. 
From the analysis of r2, we conclude that 76% of the variance in im-
ports is related to or explained by the variations in oil production. 
From the value of r, we know that there is a strong relationship between 
the variables P1 and M (oil production and total imports) . A summary of 
the values for these relationships is shown in Table 17. 
The factors that caused this positive relationship between total im-
ports and oil production include the fact that there was much money from 
oil and the urge for importations increased. With the revenue from oil 
came massive labor movements from rural to urban centers for the quest of 
the petro-naira. Food production declined and Nigeria was forced to import 
food items. With the oil revenue also came the desire and preference for 
foreign goods in place of locally produced ones. Part of the reason for 
this preference is the notion that 'made in Nigeria' goods are of low 
quality and high cost. The quality and cost are directly linked to the 
fact that Nigeria has not fully developed a standard industrial economy . 
The few industries around depend solely on importation for their equip-
ment and machinery as well as raw materials. The large number of for-
eigners in Nigeria have also contributed to this massive importation since 
most of the things they use have come from their home countries. Effective 
policies to curb this run away importation should thus focus on these items 
73 
mentioned above. 
C. Government Consumption and Oil Production 
For government consumption and oil production, Figure 17a indicates an 
exponential function and the regression equation was found to be: 
1 G = .162 + .024P2 + E 
Using 1975 data with a projected oil production of 88.4 million M.T . , the 
value of G = N2.2836 billion. Figure 17b shows the observed and predicted 
values for government consumption. The value of S (Table 17) is shown to 
be .00259. Here again the value of S is sma l l and indicates that the re-
gression equation indicates a cl ose relationship between oil production 
and government consumption. 
Once again, testing the hypothesis Ho:s1 = 0 and the alternate hy-
pothesis Ha:s1 1 0. With a = .05, we reject Ho because the value of the 
test statistic t of 9.108 is greater than the critical value of 2.110. We 
therefore, conclude that there is evidence to support the theory that 
government consumption is linearly related to oil production, with a 95% 
confidence limit of 0.024 ± 0.0096. The value of r which is the coeffi -
cient of correlation i s found to be 0.91 and si nce it is positive, it 
again indicates an upward slope to the right (see Figure 17b). This also 
indicates a close relationship. R2 is shown to be 0.83, which implies 
that 83% of the variance in government consumption is explained by the 
variation in oil production. 
The reason for the massive increase in government consumption with 
the increase in oil production can be attributed to different factors. 
Among them are: with the increase in oil production and revenue, the 
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government embarked on massive and gigantic projects such as the develop-
ment of a new federal capital territory, massive reconstruction of cities 
destroyed by the civil war, addition and expansion of highways, bridges 
and airports and schools, and other infrastructures. The creation of 
states in the country, the hosting of the 'All African Games' in Nigeria and 
the 'Al l African Festival of Arts and Culture' within a few years con-
tributed to the rise in government consumption and expenditure. With the 
oil revenue came massive foreign policy backings for other African 
countries with the petro-naira . The fact that Nigeria maintained a huge 
number of military personnel during and after the civil war, and the civil 
war itself added to the increase in government expenditure and consumption. 
Though some of t hese consumpti ons are unavoidable, the avoidable ones 
should be curtailed . Development and progress should be gradual and not 
instantaneous. Policies geared towards the development of the country _ 
through government expenditures and consumption should be taken piece by 
piece. All the above factors led to a massive creation of bureaucracies 
that consumed almost half of the total amount appropriated for government 
consumption. Policies that attempt to curtail the rate of this consump-
tion should advocate a shake-up in the bureaucratic structures. 
0. Private Consumption and Oil Production 
For private consumption and oil production, Figure 18a indicates an 
exponential function and the regression equation is shown to be: 
C = 2.058 + .0159P3 + ~l 
Using 1975 data, with oil production of 88.4 million M.T., private con-
sumption is shown to be N3.4636 billion. Figure 18b shows the plot of 
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observed and predicted values for private consumption. The value of S in 
Table 17 is shown to be .00174 . Here again, the val ue of S is small and 
indicates that the regression equation is a good description of the rela-
tionship between oil production and private consumption. 
The hypothesis to be tested here is again: Ho:e1 = 0, and Ha : e1 t 0. 
With a = .05, we reject Ho because the value of the test statistic 't' of 
9.128 is greater than the cr itical value of 2. 110. We, therefore, conclude 
that there is evidence to support the theory that private consumption is 
linearly related to oil production with a 95% confidence li mit of 0.016 ± 
0.039 . 
The value of r is found to be 0.91 and si nce it is pos itive, the lines 
slope upward to the right (see Figure 18a). R2 is shown to be 0.83. We, 
therefore, concl ude that 83% of the variance in private consumption is 
explained by the variations in oil production . 
The question posed by the positive relationship between oil production 
and private consumption i s: why was there such an urge to consume? For 
one thing, with the increase in oil production and oil revenue came salary 
increases for workers. Though only about 10% of the working population 
benefited from these salary increases through the Udoji and Williams 
awards, the effect of the increase trickled down to other sectors. There 
were high level s of importations, and because of the inadequate taxing 
system, the individual disposable income was allowed to swell out of pro-
portion . Soc ial status also indicated the rate of consumption. It is no 
surprise to see a very rich family with more than five automobiles for 
private use. Fami ly size also influenced private consumption. With the 
80 
population boom came an increase in food consumption and the consumption 
of such items like clothing, housing, health care services, etc. 
The policies of the government as mentioned above was responsible for 
these increases . Inadequate measures should have been taken in recom-
mending salary increases without commensurate productivity . People also 
need to be educated on the importance of savings and investment in the 
economy. For these purposes, rural banking should be encouraged and sup-
ported by the government. It will give people an incentive to invest 
their surpluses instead of use for uncontrollable consumption. 
E. The Consumer Price Index and 
the Oil Production Index 
For the consumer price index and oil production index, an exponential 
function is adopted (see Figure 19a) and the regression equation is given 
as: 
A = 36.15 + .0087P4 + Ll 
From the above equation, consumer price index (A) can be predicted for a 
given value of oil production index (P4). Figure 19b shows a plot of the 
observed and predicted values for the Consumer Price Index. The value of 
S in Table 17 is shown to be 0.00123. The value of S here is small, 
therefore, a good description of the relationship between the two variables 
can be deduced . 
The hypothesis to be tested is given as: Ho:s1 = 0 and Ha:s1 f 0. 
With a = .05, we again reject Ho because the value of the test statistic 
t of 7.07 is greater than the critical value of 2.110 and we conclude that 
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there is evidence of a linear relationship between consumer price index 
and oil production index, with a 95% confidence limit of 0.0057 + 0.351. 
The value of r (Table 17) is found to be 0.87. Since r is positive, 
the lines slope upward to the right (see Figure 18). R2 is shown to be 
0.75. We conclude, therefore, that 75% of the variance in the CPI is 
explained by the variations in the oil production index. 
The factors causing the positive relationship between the consumer 
price index and the oil production index hinges on some of the reasons 
mentioned earlier with the other vari ables. Since the CPI attempts to 
measure the extent to which prices paid by typical city wage earners and 
clerical workers for a typical bundle of commodities bought by such workers 
have changed in comparison with some arbitrary base period; thus, it is 
a special index that i s most conmonly referred to with regard to price 
stability. The high rise in the CPI, even in the fact of rapid unemploy-
ment is an evidence of great instability and of course a high rate of in-
flation. Some of the reasons for this high rate in the CPI include: the 
exchange rate policies, the need for hard currency, high consumption of 
goods and services without comparable increase in productivity , and the 
fact that too much money was pumped into the economy in so short a time 
without enough commodities to buy them with. Policies should, therefore, 
gear to the stabilization of the consumer price index and not to allow the 
oil revenue dictate the pace of the CPI, through the policies of the 
government. 
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F. Cocoa Production and Oil Production 
Finally, for cocoa production and oil production, a look at Figure 20 
indicates a quadratic function and following the procedure in Mendenhall 
and Reinmuth (30, p. 348), the equation will be given by: 
1 
Q = ao + 61P5* + 62P5** + E 
where P5* = P5 2 
p5** = P5 
The regression equation for cocoa production and oil production is 
thus shown to be: 
Q = .202 + .002P5 - .0000204P5
2 + r 1 
The value of S (Table 17) is shown to be .001002 . The small value for S 
indicates that the regression equation is a very good description of the 
relationship between oil production and cocoa production . 
For the slope of the line a1, the hypothesis is once more to test 
that: Ho:a1 = 0 and Ha: a1 ~ 0. With a = .05, we reject the null hypoth-
esis (Ho) because the test statistic t of 2.112 is greater than the 
critical value of 2.110. A linear relationship is thus implied, with a 
95% confidence limit of -0.0000204 ± 0.0004625. 
The value of r is shown to be -0.5 and since it is negative, it indi-
cates a downward sloping to the right. R2 is again shown to be .25 . This 
indicates that 25% of the variance in cocoa production is explained by the 
variation in oil production. 
It is basically government policies that caused the decline in cocoa 
production. As all the resources in the country were geared towards oil 
production and its allied industries, people moved to urban centers where 
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it was perceived that the government investment on and from oil would 
benefit them. Hence, rural to urban migration trippled. The government 
did nothing to encourage local farmers to remain in the rural areas. The 
Udoji and Williams awards earlier mentioned favored mostly urban dwellers. 
Concentration of a few industries were prevalent in the urban areas. There 
were lack of price incentives for farmers to produce crops, and the notion 
that farming is a poor man's job helped to facilitate rural-urban movement 
and the consequent decline in agricultural production. To counteract this 
trend, government should blend their economic policies since the inception 
of oil production to accommodate agricultural production . These are the 
root causes of the decline in agricultural production and if agricultural 
production is to increase, efforts should be made to put-up an incentive 
system to retain farmers in the rural areas. 
On the whole, one can see that all the variables above are interwoven 
with oil production and a high proportion of the blame rests on government 
policies on oil and agricultural production which precipitated these con-
ditions and the ensuing changes. 
87 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As can be seen from the whole analysis, the quantitative aspects of 
the research reinforced the qualitative aspect earlier analyzed. Another 
thing which the quantitative section did is to have a tool for future 
policy making. In actual fact, it i s seen that while GNP in current Naira 
increased, when deflated to 1975 Naira, GNP decreased (see Figure 14a) . A 
mathematical equation was thus derived with the deflated GNP, which should 
be abl e to predict what GNP would be in a particul ar year. This wil l hel p 
policy makers to plan accordingly by projecting what GNP would be and 
institute policies to increase or stabilize it in a particular year . Thus, 
for the predicted estimation of GNP, the equation is: 
y = $7,447.58 + 809.l?x + 93.60x2 + E 
The analysis also confirmed that there is a l inear relationship 
between total imports and oil production. A positive value was obtained 
for the coefficient of correlation which indicates an upward slope to the 
right as shown in Figure 15. A prediction equation was shown as: 
A 
M = .45 + . 021P 1 
This would help policy makers to predict what total imports would be 
given a certain amount of oil production. If the prediction i s too l arge 
or too small, then policy makers shou ld institute reforms to bring impor-
tations to line. 
The same is true with government consumption and private consumption. 
Both have positive 'r' values indicating positive slope upwards to the 
right as can be evidenced in Figures 17a and 18a, respectively. The anal ysis 
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also showed a linear relationship between oil production and the intensity 
of consumption in the country. A prediction equation is again given to 
help the policy maker predict in advance what government or private con-
sumption would be given a level of oil production. In this way, policies 
could be made that would curb excessive spending and consumption. For 
instance, if in 1965, government consumption was 10 billion Naira, suppose 
the equation predicts a 200% increase in government consumption within a 
year because of the level of oil production, policies could be put forward 
to adjust the increase in government consumption. This would help the 
country rather than hurt it. 
The analysis showed also that there is a linear and positive rela-
tionship between consumer price index and oil production index, i.e . , as 
oil production increased, CPI tends to increase also. A positive 'r' value 
was got indicating an upward slope to the right (see Figure 19a). Once 
again, a prediction equation was established to help policy makers adjust 
when inflation for instance is projected to be too high. 
Finally, using cocoa production to represent agricultural production, 
the initial facts were validated that with increase oil production, cocoa 
production declined. Here, a negative value was got for 'r' indicating a 
downward slope (see Figure 20). A prediction equation is established also 
to guide policy makers in their attempt to improve agricultural production. 
For instance, if the prediction equation shows a downward trend, policies 
could be made to reverse the trend before it is too late. 
Generally, what I have tried to do is to give the policy maker a tool 
for an effective policy formulation and implementation. Since oil 
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production is controlling the economy of Nigeria, it is worthwhile to 
examine some important variables relative to it, to see what the impacts 
are. I am not suggesting that this will solve the whole economic problems 
in the country, but it will go a long way to insure a more accurate pre-
diction, a more adequate policy and planning and a more reliable economy. 
Researchers are invited to critically look at each variable and try to 
come up with a more accurate prediction since each variable is influenced 
not only by oil production but by many other factors. It is my belief that 
had adequate policies been formulated and implemented, oil production would 
only be a blessing for Nigeria. 
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